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Abstract
We investigate what determines China's housing price dynamics using a
DSGE-VAR estimated with priors allowing for the featured operating of nor-
mal and “shadow” banks in China, with data observed between 2001 and
2014. We find that the housing demand shock, which is the essential factor for
housing price “bubbles” to happen, accounts for near 90% of the housing price
fluctuation. We also find that a prosperous housing market could have led to
future economic growth, though quantitatively its marginal impact is small.
But this also means that, for policy-makers who wish to stabilize the housing
market, the cost on output reduction would be rather limited.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed the first round of China's
housing market boom, which started in the early 2000s,
and yet, has no sign of ceasing, since its marketization
reform in the late 1990s. Over the period between 2002
and 2014, commodity housing price in China had grown
by 184% at national level.1 The average year-on-year
growth over this period was about 8.7%, with double
digits recorded in 2004 (17%), 2005 (12%), 2007 (16%) and
2009 (22%), albeit the short-lived “downturn” (less than
−2%) in 2008. Some cities in the east coast such as
Beijing, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Xiamen even experienced a
growth of some 15–20% per annum throughout the whole
decade (Wang & Zhang, 2014). All in a sudden, the
soared housing price in China had become a hot social
and economic topic that evoked wide concerns and dis-
cussions. Many agree the housing market plays a key role
in China's economic growth, and that, to understand
what determines its dynamics, boom and bust is of great
importance for understanding the Chinese economy.
Especially, given the background that the collapse of
U.S. housing market finally led to the “subprime crisis”
and that the scene of the Japanese “lost decades” follow-
ing the burst of its “housing bubbles” remains vivid,
many are concerned whether China, now the world's sec-
ond largest economy, will follow the old road to ruin.
On the other hand, the literature on the determinants
of China's housing price is fast growing. Some authors
have tested the housing market equilibrium condition
derived from a partial equilibrium model and evaluated
the significance of the supposed demand and supply fac-
tors. Many have come to conclude that the upswing was
mainly a reflection of changed market “fundamentals,”
although as for the specific factors and their respective
importance less consensus is made. For example, while
most have agreed on the decisive role of disposable
income and land price, Wang and Zhang (2014) find pop-
ulation was also important, as opposed to Deng, Ma, and
Chiang (2009) and Wang, Yang, and Liu (2011) who
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reject its significance. Similarly, although construction
costs and interest rate are shown to have affected little in
Deng et al. and Wang et al., respectively, Wang and
Zhang—echoing Li and Chand (2013) and Chow and
Niu (2015)—find the former mattered in theirs, while Xu
and Chen (2012) find evidence for the latter.
Such ambiguities are perhaps not surprising, given
the usual difficulties pervading these single-equation
studies: first, that most of these work have relied on a
casual conceptual framework has determined that
“equilibrium conditions” derived from such models are
easy victims of omitted variables, such that a factor
found significant in one model may simply be so
because that model has failed to reflect others that
would be embraced by the “true” model. Of course,
without an explicit model that details the whole under-
lying economic structure, there would be no way of tell-
ing. Thus, unless one is willing to impose very strong
assumptions on how he knows the “true” model, esti-
mating such “equilibrium conditions” could have been
a hasty attempt that brings more doubts, if not
misconception, than evidence.
In fact, even if one is able to identify the “true” equi-
librium condition(s), that macroeconomic variables are
widely correlated in practice due to economic interac-
tions would still mean these conditions are hard to esti-
mate, as such interactions endogenize the explanatory
variables on them. Thus, econometricians are forced
either to assume these variables are pre-determined in
other markets (such as Deng et al. and Li and Chand just
cited), or to find “instruments” to get approximation of
them to avoid inconsistent estimation (Wu, Feng, &
Li, 2014). However, none of these could solve the prob-
lem to its root, for a) that by imposing exogeneity the eco-
nomic interactions as reflected by the data would be
artificially abandoned in the modelling process, and b)
that within a partial equilibrium model where one is
much agnostic about the rest of the economy, there is lit-
tle information about the “true” instruments. Indeed, if
endogeneity also arises because the explanatory variables
on these equilibrium conditions are correlated, that is,
when multi-colinearity happens, it can even overstate the
standard error of the coefficients of these variables, caus-
ing them to be shown insignificant even when they are
not. Thus, while the omitted variable problem just men-
tioned is one that could be improved by using a more
inclusive model, the endogeneity problem here is one
that is inherent in any model variant where equilibrium
is estimated with single equations.2
Both of these technical difficulties are therefore extra
challenges to “single-equation studies” which also receive
criticisms from theorists. The main issue here is how (lit-
tle) one could learn about what determined the housing
price dynamics from exploiting an estimated equilibrium
condition, which is merely a description of the steady-
state correlation, rather than causal relation, between
housing price and other supposed “determinants.” Thus,
Wen and Goodman (2013) and Chow and Niu (2015)
have gone one step further to use a dynamic econometric
model—a VAR in the former and a VECM in the latter—
to evaluate what could have “Granger-caused” the hous-
ing price. Liang and Cao (2007), Guo and Huang (2010),
Chen, Guo, and Zhu (2011), Zhang, An, and Yu (2012),
Zhang, Hua, and Zhao (2012) and Chiang (2014) have
even waived the partial models and focused only on the
empirical responses of housing price to the lags of poten-
tial determinants, noting that any equilibrium conditions
derived from a partial model would tell little about causal
relations. Thus, these authors are able to answer what
(Granger-)caused housing price to change as the data
dynamics show. That these VAR and VECM being pure
econometric models has also allowed them to test the
impact of factors which do not usually affect demand
and/or supply of houses directly in a partial model (such
as money growth and interest rates), and factors that are
difficult to model in a structural model (such as gender
imbalance and urbanization)—this way, they also cir-
cumvent the endogeneity problem now that explanatory
variables are all lagged when they enter the model.
However, from the policy viewpoint the usefulness of
such VAR/VECM estimates are still rather limited, as
these reduced-form models are providing no information
about how housing price is determined as different eco-
nomic agents interact. Thus, even if one is able to tell
from estimating these models what could have affected
housing price and the extent to which they could have
affected it, there is little he could exploit with such infor-
mation (which tells literally nothing about the transmis-
sion mechanism which would be key to policy-makers)
to guide policies—the well-known problem of the
Lucas (1976)'s critique. Although some authors (such as
Bian and Gete (2015)) have attempted to fix this hole by
imposing theoretical restrictions for their estimations—
thus, the structural VAR approach that aims to provide
theoretical interpretation for the reduced-form estimates,
such a remedying is, however, rather metaphysical, as
the implication is usually sensitive to the imposed restric-
tions, the “identification schemes,” that are often chosen
for producing results presumed “reasonable” a priori
(Fernández-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramirez, 2008; Uhlig,
2005). Another related difficulty of the SVAR approach is
the general disconnect between the true structure of the
underlying data-generating process and what is defined
as “structural” in the SVAR representation of it; such a
“fundamental conceptual weakness”—to quote Benati
and Surico (2009)—has determined that SVAR models
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are not reliable, either, for understanding how housing
price dynamics was fundamentally determined.
All the above thus points the way to using a micro-
founded structural model where causal relationships
between economic variables are established as different
economic agents interact with their optimal choice. Thus
in the more recent attempts, a growing number of
authors have started to follow Iacoviello (2005) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to construct a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to identify
what could have determined China's housing price
dynamics and the transmission mechanism working
behind it. Thus, Minetti and Peng (2015) pioneer to use a
real business cycle model to study how social
psychology—the “keeping up with the Zhangs” behav-
iour, as they call it, in analogous to Gal (1994)'s “keeping
up with the Joneses” hypothesis—could have amplified
and prolonged the impact of housing preference shocks
on the housing price. Ng (2015) and Wen and He (2015)
build a New Keynesian model to study how different
monetary policies—a Taylor rule in the former and a
McCallum rule in the latter—affect the housing market.
Zhou and Jariyapan (2013) consider a policy mix where
stabilization is assisted by an affordable housing policy,
an ad valorem property tax, and a land policy that aims
at stabilizing the land price. Garriga, Tang, and
Wang (2016) deviate from these authors by establishing a
regional model that replicates the urbanization process
caused by structural transformation of the Chinese econ-
omy. Thus, almost all these DSGE modellers have found
that shocks to housing demand and monetary policy
dominated the boom; following this, most have suggested
that to stabilize the housing market, measures such as
property tax and property-purchasing limitations could
be convenient for suppressing demand; for reducing pol-
icy mistakes, the implication would be that the People's
Bank of China improves its management skills and act
more independently in policy-making.
However, one important aspect the existing efforts
have not quite explored is the channel through which the
banking system could be propagating these shocks. While
Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010) have offered an
early example, many in this area have remained using
models where banks work implicitly, with a simple col-
lateral constraint connecting the housing sector and the
wider economy. However, since the banking system itself
could have also been a source of instability, and that
institutional setting of the banking system could have
affected the dynamics of the whole economy, as one con-
tribution of this paper, we embed in our DSGE model an
explicit banking sector (which resembles, but differs from
Gerali et al. (2010)), which has never been attempted for
studying the Chinese economy. Our contributions also
come from the novel way in which we model the banking
system, where we allow “shadow banks” to operate in a
sub-system affiliated to the main system constituted by
“normal banks,” to reflect the unique business structure
of commercial banks in China, where “shadow” banking
business expanded substantially after the Great Stimulus
initiative in 2009. Thus, to the literature on the determi-
nation of housing price dynamics, we are the first to use
a DSGE model where the explicit role of both normal
banks and shadow banks is allowed for; to the recent
developments in modelling the banking system, our way
of modelling shadow banks has allowed them to interact
with normal banks, which existing studies (such as
Verona, Martins, and Drumond (2013) and Funke,
Mihaylovski, and Zhu (2015) as we compare below) are
unable to capture.
On the study of house prices itself, we also establish
quantitatively robust evidence regarding the nature, fre-
quency and duration of housing booms and “bubbles,”
with Monte Carlo experiments for different scenarios,
which previous studies have not been able to do. On the
interaction between the housing cycle and the business
cycle, we also establish to what extent the mean predic-
tion of our DSGE model is supported by the sample data,
using a formal statistical test, which is seldom carried out
in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following:
Section 2 constructs the DSGE model, with a particular
focus on the working of the banking sector. Section 3
explains the DSGE-VAR approach, which we use to esti-
mate the model. We establish the empirical evidence in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 | THE DSGE MODEL
We follow the classic Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) approach to model the Chinese economy
with a heterogeneous-agents model consisting of two
types of households (“patient” and “impatient”), entre-
preneurs, retailers and the public sector. These
Iacoviello-type models feature a collateral borrowing con-
straint in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which
limits the capacity of borrowing to a fraction of the mar-
ket value of the borrowers’ physical assets, such as
houses, lands and capitals, where the borrowing con-
straint also bridges the housing market and the real econ-
omy to allow for market spillovers. While most have
ignored the role played by financial intermediaries,
Gerali et al. (2010) is one of the few pioneers who inte-
grate into the basic model the banking sector to study
how banks’ optimization problem could have affected the
propagation of “macroeconomic” and “monetary”
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shocks. By allowing for shocks originated from the bank-
ing sector, they also explored how “financial” shocks
could have affected the business cycle.
The model we build here extends this progress. It
does so by introducing into the basic Iacoviello model a
banking sector where a shadow-banking system co-exist
with the main system, but it operates effectively as a
“shadow-banking department” of normal banks. To keep
the paper concise we only outline the key equations of
the “standard sectors” here, but elaborate the banking
sector which is our innovation in full. The optimization
problems of the whole model are outlined in Appendix A.
Tables A1 and A2 provide a glossary of the model vari-
ables and disturbances.
2.1 | Patient households
There is a continuum of measure one of patient households
who consume both normal goods and houses (cPt and h
P
t ),
work to produce these products (nPc,t and n
P
h,t ),
3 and save
with normal time deposits (St). Their life-time utility is:
E0
X∞
t=0
βPGcP
 t
jt lnc
P
t +ϕtlnh
P
t −
ψ t
1+ ηP
nP1+ ξ
P
c,t +n
P1+ ξP
h,t
 1+ ηP
1+ ξP
" #
ð1Þ
where βP is the discount factor, GcP is the steady-state
growth rate of consumption of normal goods, ϕt is the
relative preference to houses (which can be interpreted
as the housing demand shock), ψ t is the relative prefer-
ence to leisure (the labour supply shock), ηP is the inverse
of labour elasticity, ξP is the substitutability of labour for
goods and for house production, and jt is the shock to
intertemporal preference.
Patient households have budget constraint:
cPt + qh, t h
P
t − 1−δhð ÞhPt−1
 
+ St =w
P
c, tn
P
c, t +w
P
h, tn
P
h, t
+ 1+ rSt−1
 
St−1 +Π
Fgds
t + 1−χð ÞΠNbankt−1 +ΠSbankt−1 −τt ð2Þ
where expenses on the L.H.S. of (2) are financed with
resources on the R.H.S., where qh, t is the price of houses
(relative to normal goods’ which is normalized to 1), δh is
the depreciation rate of houses, wPc,t and w
P
h,t are the real
wages for producing goods and houses, respectively, rSt is
the real deposit rate, ΠFgdst , 1−χð ÞΠNbankt−1 and ΠSbankt−1 are
lump-sum profit transfers to patient households who are
assumed to own both retail firms, normal banks and
shadow banks modelled in the later sections,4 and τt is a
lump-sum tax levied.
Patient households maximize (1) by choosing cPt , h
P
t ,
nPc,t , n
P
h,t and St, subject to (2). The problem returns a set
of optimal conditions which represent the marginal rates
of substitution of future consumption, houses and leisure,
against current consumption. Intuitively, these set the
demand for normal goods and houses, and the supply of
labour, of patient households (Equations A.3–A.7 in
Appendix A).
2.2 | Impatient households
There is a continuum of measure one of impatient house-
holds who consume (cIt ), buy houses (h
I
t ), and work (n
I
c,t
and nIh,t ), just as patient households. However, impatient
households do not save; being impatient, they always
spend more than their wage income, and therefore have
to finance the excess with loans taken from the banking
sector. We assume these loans are provided both by nor-
mal banks (bI
0
t ) and by shadow banks (b
I00
t ). However, as
we establish later, the cost of normal loans (rNLt ) is always
lower than that of shadow loans (rILt ). We let the amount
one can borrow be restricted to a fraction of the
present value of the borrower's physical assets by the
time the obligation is due, in the spirit of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). We also let such a fraction, the
loan-to-value ratio (LTV), be affected by credit policy,
and that LTV of normal loans (ΘH, t) would shift in an
opposite way to that of shadow loans (ΞH, t), should credit
policy vary.5
Impatient households maximize:
E0
X∞
t=0
βIGcI
 t
jt lnc
I
t +ϕtlnh
I
t −
ψ t
1+ ηI
nI1+ ξ
I
c,t +n
I1+ ξI
h,t
 1+ ηI
1+ ξI
" #
ð3Þ
by choosing cIt , h
I
t , n
I
c,t , n
I
h,t , b
I 0
t and b
I00
t , subject to budget
constraint:
cIt + qh, t h
I
t − 1−δhð ÞhIt−1
 
+ 1+ rNLt−1
 
bI
0
t−1
+ 1+ rILt−1
 
bI
00
t−1 =w
I
c, tn
I
c, t +w
I
h, tn
I
h, t + b
I0
t + b
I 00
t ð4Þ
and borrowing constraints with normal and shadow
banks:
bI
0
t ≤ΘH,t
Et qh,t+1h
I
t
 
1+ rNLt
ð5Þ
and
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bI
00
t ≤ΞH,t
Et qh,t+1h
I
t
 
1+ rILt
ð6Þ
where variables have their usual meaning, βI < βP, ΘH,
t + ΞH, t < 1, and superscript “I“ denotes variables for
impatient households.
The optimization problem implies the marginal rates
of substitution which resemble those in the patient
household problem (A.12-A.17 in Appendix A). The bor-
rowing constraints determine the demand for normal
and shadow loans for a given level of credit control.
2.3 | Entrepreneurs
On the supply side, there is a continuum of measure one
of entrepreneurs who produce intermediate goods (Yt)
and houses (iht) with labour (nPc,t , n
p
h,t , n
I
c,t and n
I
h,t ), capi-
tals (kc, t and kh, t) and lands (lt, for houses only), and use
profits from these businesses to finance consumption (cEt ),
which is the only element that enters their utility func-
tion. Like impatient households, entrepreneurs also
borrow from normal and shadow banks (bE
0
t and b
E00
t ).
Both the intermediate goods market and housing market
are perfectly competitive.
Entrepreneurs maximize:
E0
X∞
t=0
γGcEð Þt jtlncEt ð7Þ
by choosing cEt , subject to budget constraint:
cEt + ic,t + ih,t + ql,t lt− lt−1ð Þ+wPc,tnPc,t +wPh,tnPh,t +wIc,tnIc,t +wIh,tnIh,t
+ 1+ rNLt−1
 
bE
0
t−1 + 1+ r
IL
t−1
 
bE
00
t−1
=
Yt
Xt
+ qh,t iht + b
E0
t + b
E00
t ð8Þ
borrowing constraints with normal and shadow banks:
bE
0
t ≤ΘE,t
Et ql,t+1lt + kc,t + kh,t
 
1+ rNLt
ð9Þ
and
bE
00
t ≤ΞE,t
Et ql,t+1lt + kc,t + kh,t
 
1+ rILt
ð10Þ
and production functions:
Yt = Ac,t nPc,t
 α
nIc,t
 1−αh i1−uc
kucc,t−1 ð11Þ
and
iht = Ah,t nPh,t
 α
nIh,t
 1−αh i1−uh−vh
kuhh,t−1l
vh
t−1 ð12Þ
where γ(<βP) and GcE are, respectively, the discount fac-
tor and the steady-state growth in consumption of entre-
preneurs, ql, t is the relative price of lands, ΘE, t and ΞE, t
are LTVs which ensure ΘE, t+ΞE, t<1 but would shift in
opposite ways should credit policy vary, α, uc, uh and vh
are input shares of production, and Ac, t and Ah, t are the
technologies.6 Other variables have their usual meaning,
and we use superscript “E” to denote “entrepreneurs.” 1Xt
is the relative price of intermediate goods that we define
formally in the retailers’ problem in the next section.
The accumulation of capitals follows:
kc,t−kc,t−1 = ic,t−δkckc,t−1 ð13Þ
and
kh,t−kh,t−1 = ih,t−δkhkh,t−1 ð14Þ
where ic, t and ih, t are private investments and δkc and δkh
are the depreciation rates.
The entrepreneurs’ problem determines their demand
for normal goods and labours (A.28-A.32 in Appendix A),
and the optimal trade-offs between normal goods and
capitals and lands which are their demand for the last
two (A.33-A.35). Their demand for bank loans is deter-
mined by the borrowing constraints. The supply of inter-
mediate goods and houses is determined by the
production functions.
2.4 | Retailers
There is a continuum of measure one of retailers who
buy intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate
them at no cost, and sell the final composite of differenti-
ated goods (YFinalt ) at Pt, which is normalized to 1, and is
a mark-up (Xt) to the price of the intermediate goods.
The final goods market is monopolistically competitive.
We follow Calvo (1983) to assume that in each period only
a fraction (1 − ω) of retailers are able to reset their prices to
the optimal level, while the rest adjust theirs according to an
indexation rule in the spirit of Smets andWouters (2003):
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pt+ i jð Þ= pt jð Þ
Pt+ i−1
Pt−1
 	ϵ
ð15Þ
where 0 ≤ ϵ ≤ 1 is the extent to which prices of differenti-
ated goods, pt( j), are indexed to past inflation.
Retailers who are able to reset prices maximize:
Et
X∞
i=0
ωβPGc
 i
V t,t+ i
pt+ i jð Þ
Pt+ i
 	
Yt+ i jð Þ− 1Xt+ i Y t+ i jð Þ

 
ð16Þ
by choosing pt( j), subject to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)'s
CES demand for Yt( j)
7:
Yt jð Þ= pt jð ÞPt

 −θ
YFinalt ð17Þ
and (15), to find the optimal reset price for differentiated
goods, pt jð Þ8:
pt jð Þ=
θ
θ−1ð Þ
Et
P∞
i=0
ωβPGc
 i
V t,t+ iYFinalt+ i
1
Xt+ i
Pθt+ iP
−θϵ
t+ i−1P
θϵ
t−1
Et
P∞
i=0
ωβPGc
 i
V t,t+ iYFinalt+ i P
θ−1
t+ i P
ϵ 1−θð Þ
t+ i−1P
ϵ θ−1ð Þ
t−1
ð18Þ
Let the general price level be:
Pt =
ð1
0
pt jð Þ1−θdj

  1
1−θ
ð19Þ
Equation (19) can be linearized around a zero-
inflation steady state, using (15) and (18), to find:
πt =
βPGc
1+ βPGcϵ
Etπt+1 +
ϵ
1+ βPGcϵ
πt−1
+
1−ωð Þ 1−ωβPGc
 
ω 1+ βPGcϵ
  − X̂ t + ε̂π, t ð20Þ
which is the “hybrid” version of the New Keynesian Phil-
lips curve. It finds that inflation (πt) is affected not only
by past inflation but also expected future inflation. It also
varies with the percentage deviation of real marginal cost
of final goods production from the steady-state level
(− X̂ t), subject to “inflation shock” (ε̂π,t).
2.5 | The banking sector
Our approach to the banking sector is an innovation
based on the recent development of Verona et al. (2013),
who initiated to model the banking sector within a DSGE
model by allowing for a “shadow” banking system that
operates in parallel with the “normal” system. The
Verona et al. approach categorizes borrowers (firms, in
their case) into two types based on their risk of default.
They let “safe” borrowers who are able to issue corporate
bonds raise funds with the assistance of investment
banks, which they define as shadow banks. “Risky” bor-
rowers who are unable to do so take regular loans from
commercial banks. The two systems run in parallel, and
are disconnected both in size and in their institutional
setting.
Such an approach is then applied by Funke
et al. (2015) to China, where development of financial
markets is much behind, and short-term financing is
much different. Allen, Qian, and Gu (2017) provide an
overview. Among others, a key feature they highlight is
the coexistence of the formal sector dominated by com-
mercial banks, and a growing informal sector constituted
by various non-bank financial service providers not
(or less) regulated by the People's Bank of China and the
Banking Regulatory Commission. The latter embraces
both financial intermediaries (such as bank departments
designated for off-balance-sheet businesses, investment
banks, hedge funds, micro-credit companies, pawnshops
and money houses), and direct lending services (such as
interpersonal lending, rotating savings, money lenders
and loan sharks)—See also Tsai (2004), Allen, Qian, and
Xie (2019) and Arora and Zhang (2019). However, not all
borrowers share equal opportunities accessing to these
sectors. Most notably, because state-owned/state-holding
companies are usually “backed” by the country and they
share similar ownership structure with most commercial
banks (of which many are also state-owned/state-hold-
ing), they are generally considered safer, and hence, have
much easier access to regular bank loans compared to
non-state-owned companies. By contrast, non-state-
owned companies face much higher barriers in accessing
to these loans. For accessing to funds, they often turn to
the informal sector, where they either sell wealth man-
agement products or take entrusted loans via commercial
banks, or seek for other sources from the various “capital
pools” just mentioned, which generally imply a higher
cost of borrowing.9
Thus, Funke et al. motivate their application of the
Verona et al. model by viewing such funds’ channelling
to non-state-owned companies as services provided by
“shadow banks,” while regular bank loans offered to
state-owned/state-holding companies as services pro-
vided by “normal banks.” Their modelling of the banking
sector is essentially identical to Verona et al., although in
their application to China they have let risky borrowers
who have difficulties accessing to normal bank loans
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engage in shadow-banking activities, whereas in Verona
et al. shadow banking arises as safe borrowers raise funds
by bond issuing to avoid higher cost of borrowing from
normal banks.
However, the fact that both Verona et al. and Funke
et al. have modelled the normal and shadow-banking sys-
tems in parallel has also determined that these systems in
their models are institutionally disconnected. This is
practically at odds if we allow for the complex correla-
tions pervading these systems in practice. Especially,
since shadow banking in China is much a consequence
of difficulties accessing to loans from normal banks, it
may well happen that, if credit conditions in the normal
system tighten which causes commercial banks to con-
tract their balance sheet, such a change could cause the
shadow system to expand as borrowers get around tight-
ened conditions with shadow activities. This also suggests
that, in practice, the relative size of the normal/shadow
systems may change in response to changed economic
conditions, which is abandoned in Verona et al. and in
Funke et al.
Such a connection is precisely what we aim to
establish in our novel way of modelling the banking
sector. In particular, instead of letting normal banks
and shadow banks work in parallel, we model shadow
banks in China as a “shadow-banking department” of
normal banks designated for loan business not to be
recorded on the normal banks’ balance sheet. Using
the words of Ehlers, Kong, and Zhu (2018), they are
more like the “shadow of the banks.” Thus, for lending
to impatient households and entrepreneurs, shadow
banks first take loans from normal banks at the normal
rate. They then lend the collected funds to households
and entrepreneurs who fail to raise sufficient funds
with normal bank loans at a premium rate. We make
no distinction between “safe” and “risky” borrowers as
in Funke et al. But we let impatient households and
entrepreneurs be customers of both normal and
shadow banks, while the proportion of normal/
shadow-banking activities be governed by the country's
credit policy; and we let credit policy affect the size of
the two systems in opposite ways to reflect the substi-
tutability between normal and shadow loans.
Our approach to the banking sector therefore estab-
lishes a connection between the normal banking system
and the shadow system. Its structure resembles the inter-
action between “wholesale banks” and “retail banks” of
Gerali et al. (2010), though in our setting the shadow sys-
tem works as a bypass of frictions in the normal system
to mimic the unique loan-providing structure of China.
As in standard DSGE models, we confine our scope of
the “banking sector” to the marketplace where financial
intermediaries play a central role in the channelling of
funds—that is, where indirect financing takes place. It
therefore precludes direct financing, such as borrowing
from friends/relatives, which is part of informal financing
as defined in Allen, Qian, and Xie (2019). We go on to
describe the banking sector optimization problems in
what follows.
2.5.1 | The “normal” system
The normal banking system is constituted by a continuum
of measure one of normal banks, which take deposits (St)
from patient households, convert them to normal bank
loans (Bt) with costs, and lend them to impatient house-
holds, entrepreneurs and shadow banks (such as invest-
ment banks) with no preference, except that lending to the
latter is exempt from any collateral conditions. At the end
of each period, normal banks retain a fraction (χ) of their
profit (ΠNbankt ) as capital reserve, and send the rest
1−χð ÞΠNbankt as a lump-sum transfer to patient house-
holds who are assumed to be the owners.
We let normal banks be price-takers to reflect the
People's Bank of China's heavy manipulation on com-
mercial bank interest rates. The normal bank problem is
to maximize:
Max
Bt
ΠNbankt =
X∞
t=0
ΛNbank0, t 1+ r
NL
t
 
Bt−Bt+1
 f
+ St+1− 1+ rSt
 
St
 
−
c
2
Ϝt
Bt
−Ω
 	2
Ϝt +ΔϜt+1g
ð21Þ
by choosing Bt, subject to the balance sheet constraint:
Bt = St +Ϝ t ð22Þ
where Ϝ t is the banks’ capital reserve, accumulated out of
retained profit from the last period, following:
Ϝ t = 1−δϜ
 
Ϝ t−1 + χΠNbankt−1 ð23Þ
where χ is the retention ratio, and δϜ is the real resources
used for capital management. ΛNbank0,t in (21) is the dis-
count factor. c2
Ϝt
Bt
−Ω
 2
Ϝ t (where c>0) is the real
resources used for creating loans.10 Ω is the optimal
capital-to-assets ratio.
The normal banks’ problem implies:
rNLt −r
S
t = −c
Ϝ t
Bt
−Ω
 	
Ϝ t
Bt
 	2
ð24Þ
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which suggests that, for given interest spread and divi-
dend policy, profit maximization would require normal
banks to set their loan supply to a level, such that the
marginal revenue of supplying those loans (the L.H.S. of
(24)) is equal to the marginal cost of supplying them (the
R.H.S.). Another way of interpreting it is that the supply
of loan must be kept to an optimal level, which is
“backed” by the banks’ reserve level for given interest
spread, which is the basis of the “credit cycle” story of
Gerali et al. (2010). Of course, such an optimal condition
may not always hold in practice due to the occurrence of
“banking shocks” (εB, t). We therefore allow for such
imperfection in our application and modify the above to:
εB,t r
NL
t −r
S
t
 
= −c
Ϝ t
Bt
−Ω
 	
Ϝ t
Bt
 	2
ð25Þ
Equation (25) suggests a rise in εB, t causes the loan
supply to fall, ceteris paribus. Thus, a positive realization
of εB, t is a reflection of tightened credit conditions in the
normal system. Since normal banks are the only fund
provider to shadow banks, this would also tighten the
credit conditions of the shadow system. Hence, the entire
banking sector is involved.
2.5.2 | The “shadow” system
The shadow system is constituted by a continuum of
measure one of monopolistic “shadow banks,” which are
not confined by the general rules (especially, require-
ments on reserve ratios) applicable to normal banks.
Shadow banks acquire loans from normal banks, acting
as demander of normal loans, just as impatient house-
holds and entrepreneurs on the one hand; on the other
hand, they lend the acquired loans to impatient house-
holds and entrepreneurs simultaneously, acting on that
occasion as provider of shadow loans.
Shadow banks are also owned by patient households.
For simplicity, we assume they do not keep any profit
(ΠSbankt ), but send all of them to patient households at the
end of each period.11 We let shadow loans be produced
with no costs. The optimization problem of an individual
shadow bank is to maximize:
Max
rILt zð Þ
ΠSbankt zð Þ=
X∞
t=0
ΛSbank0, t 1+ r
IL
t zð Þ
 
ILt zð Þ

− 1+ rNLt
 
ILt zð Þg ð26Þ
by choosing the “shadow loan rate,” rILt zð Þ, taking rNLt as
given, subject to the demand for loan function:
ILt zð Þ= 1+ r
IL
t zð Þ
1+ rILt

 −ηSbank
ILt ð27Þ
which assumes the demand for loan from individual
bank z is determined by the total loan demanded, and
the relative rate of interest the individual bank charges
compared to the average rate of the industry, where
−ηSbank is the interest-rate elasticity of demand for
shadow loans, and ΛSbank0,t in (26) is the discount factor.
The first order condition of the shadow bank problem
implies:
1+ rILt zð Þ=
ηSbank
ηSbank−1
 	
1+ rNLt
  ð28Þ
which, by imposing a symmetric equilibrium, further
implies:
1+ rILt =
ηSbank
ηSbank−1
 	
1+ rNLt
  ð29Þ
which shows the optimal shadow rate is a constant mark-
up ( η
Sbank
ηSbank−1) to the “normal rate.”
2.6 | The public sector
2.6.1 | Monetary policy
We let monetary policy follow a Taylor rule, where nomi-
nal official rate (Rt) responds to inflation (φπ) and eco-
nomic growth (φx), with policy inertia (ρR):
1 +Rt = 1+Rt−1ð ÞρR 1+ πtð Þ 1−ρRð Þφπ GDPtGcGDPt−1
 	 1−ρRð Þφx
1+ rssð Þ 1−ρRð ÞεMP, t
ð30Þ
where rss is the steady-state value of the real interest rate,
εMP, t is the monetary policy error, and GDPt is defined
to be:
GDPt =Yt + qhiht ð31Þ
where qh is the steady-state value of the real housing
price.12
For simplicity, we let the central bank rate be equal
to the deposit rate normal banks offer to patient house-
holds. We can establish the following Fisher identity:
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Rt = rSt +Etπt+1 ð32Þ
The version relating the real lending rate of normal
loans to its corresponding nominal rate is as follows:
RNLt = r
NL
t +Etπt+1 ð33Þ
2.6.2 | Credit policy
We also follow Peng (2012) to allow for a credit control
policy where credit tightness of the financial market (Θt)
is governed by a counter-cyclical feedback rule, and we
let it mimic the Taylor rule in our application:
Θt =Θ
ρΘ
t−1
GDPt
GcGDPt−1
 	zx
ΘεCP,t ð34Þ
where Θ is the steady-state degree of credit tightness,
zx<0 is the counter-cyclical policy response, and εCP, t is
the credit policy error. Since the People's Bank of China
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission have
never announced any specific credit control rules, exis-
ting studies have mostly specified a credit rule equation
like ours, both as a parsimonious reflection of the
counter-cyclical nature of macroprudential policies, and
to respect the inverse relationships between credits
and growth, and between the loan-to-capital ratio and
growth, as in Chinese data. In theory Θt could have
responded to other variables, such as the growth of
credits or house prices (Rubio, 2019), or both (Wang &
Sun, 2013). But we find none of these alternative specifi-
cations outperforms (34) in fitting the data—in fact, they
are far less ideal according to the models’ marginal likeli-
hood.13 Hence, our specification of the credit control rule
here is both consistent with the literature and favoured
by the data.
In contrast to the Taylor rule that determines the
price of loans, the credit policy moderates their size
directly, by setting a limit beyond which loans in the
monitored system cannot be further supplied to the bor-
rowers. We assume that both impatient households’ and
entrepreneurs’ borrowing from the normal banking sys-
tem are governed by such policy, such that:
Θ̂H,t = Θ̂E,t = Θ̂t ð35Þ
where “94” denotes the percentage deviation from the
steady-state value. We further assume that, when credit
condition in the normal system tightens/loosens, there
will be a proportional increase/decrease in the demand
for shadow bank loans, as borrowers get around credit
control via the shadow system; and we summarize such a
quantitative relationship parsimoniously as the
following14:
Ξ̂H,t = Ξ̂E,t = −Θ̂t ð36Þ
Thus, while the credit policy provides an additional
mechanism through which stabilization policy could be
implemented, it would be so implemented by deepening
the financial frictions caused by the borrowing con-
straints on normal loans. However as we just pointed
out, such a quantitative distortion would be partially
corrected as borrowers get around the restriction by tak-
ing shadow loans, so from the policy viewpoint the effi-
cacy of credit control would be subsequently neutralized.
Nevertheless, since shadow rate is a mark-up to normal
rate, the credit policy would still be stabilizing, in analo-
gous to the Taylor rule.
2.6.3 | Fiscal policy
We assume fiscal policy is Ricardian, and for simplicity,
government spending (gt) is financed with the lump-sum
tax revenue levied from patient households, such that:
gt = g
ρg
t−1ug,tu
ρgc
Ac,t ð37Þ
and
gt = τt ð38Þ
where ρg and ug, t in (37) are the persistence and innova-
tion in government spending, respectively; and ρgc is the
impact of innovation in technology (uAc, t) on net exports,
counted in government spending as in Smets and
Wouters (2007).
2.7 | Market clearing, trends and shocks
Normal goods market clearing requires:
Ct + It + gt =Yt−
c
2
Ϝ t−1
Bt−1
−Ω
 	2
Ϝ t−1−δϜϜ t−1 ð39Þ
where Ct = cPt + c
I
t + c
E
t and It = ic, t+ ih, t.
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Housing market clearing requires:
hPt − 1−δhð ÞhPt−1 + hIt − 1−δhð ÞhIt−1 = iht ð40Þ
Financial market clearing requires:
bI
0
t + b
I 00
t + b
E
0
t + b
E00
t =Bt ð41Þ
Labour market clears automatically because of Walras's
law, where total labour Nt = nPc,t
 α
nIc,t
 1−α
+ nPh,t
 a
nIh,t
 1−α.
Land supply is fixed at its steady-state value, follow-
ing the standard “perfect inelasticity” assumption in the
literature:
lt =l ð42Þ
This is to reflect the fact that, although land supply
elasticity varies across regions in China, the aggregate
supply grows slowly and, taking into account popula-
tion growth, the per capita supply is close to a constant.
Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) provide a similar discussion
and show that even if a deterministic trend is allowed
for the land process it would not materially change the
result. Hsu, Li, Tang, and Wu (2017) find evidence
from data of 286 Chinese cities which echoes this
assumption.
We let the steady-state equilibrium be driven by tech-
nologies advancing with deterministic trends (γAc and
γAh) over the long run along the “balanced growth path,”
and that cyclical movements around it in the short run
be caused by stochastic shocks not only to technologies
(Zc, t and Zh, t), but also to preferences (jt, ϕt and ψ t), loan
provision (εB, t) and policies (εMP, t, εCP, t and gt), which
are all mean-reversing and governed by an AR(1) process.
We specify these shock processes in Appendix A
(Equations A.69–A.78) to save space. Now, we proceed to
estimate the model.
3 | MODEL ESTIMATION
3.1 | The DSGE-VAR approach
Unlike the mainstream literature where a DSGE model is
mostly estimated on its own, we follow Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2004, 2006) and Del Negro, Schorfheide,
Smets, and Wouters (2007) to estimate ours as a DSGE-
VAR, which can be seen as a weighted combination of a
DSGE model and an unrestricted VAR—hence, a VAR
embedded with cross-equation restrictions imposed by
the DSGE model.
The main advantage of adopting a DSGE-VAR in sub-
stitution of a pure DSGE model lies in that, by allowing
for discrepancy between the data and a DSGE model, the
DSGE-VAR approach calibrates a “hyper-parameter,”
λ = [0, ∞], which measures the extent to which cross-
equation restrictions of a DSGE model have to be
released for the resulted VAR to best mimic the data.
When λ = 0, the DSGE restrictions are fully released, and
the DSGE-VAR reduces to an unrestricted VAR; when
λ = ∞, the DSGE restrictions are strictly imposed, and
the DSGE-VAR is an equivalent transformation of the
DSGE model. The estimation algorithm searches for the
optimal “weight,” λ̂, such that:
λ̂=argmax
λΛ
p Y jλð Þ
where p(Y| λ) =
Ð
p(Y| θ, Σ, Φ)  p(θ, Σ, Φ| λ)  d(θ, Σ, Φ)
is the marginal data likelihood, θ is the vector of DSGE
model parameters, Σ is the variance–covariance matrix of
the VAR innovations, Φ is the vector of VAR parameters,
and Λ is the vector of all possible λ's. The resulted DSGE-
VAR(λ̂ ) is an analytical framework lying between the
unrestricted VAR and the DSGE model, which, on the
one hand, reflects the working of the DSGE model, and
on the other, is “calibrated” to fit the data as closely as
possible—thus, a model founded both in theory and in
facts. Since λ measures how much DSGE model restric-
tions are used for the best-fitting model to be found, it
can also be viewed as a “goodness-of-fit” indicator of the
DSGE model, which is not available in the conventional
practice of estimating a pure DSGE model.
While Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) describe the
full technical details of estimating a DSGE-VAR, the esti-
mation procedure is based on the familiar Bayesian
method, though in this application the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is used, not for updating
the prior distributions of the DSGE model parameters
directly, but for updating the priors of the VAR coeffi-
cients which are centred at the DSGE model restrictions.
The hyper-parameter λ then scales the covariance matrix
of the priors of the VAR coefficients that determines how
diffuse such priors are, as the random-walk Metropolis
algorithm searches over the parameter space. Draws that
are able to increase the conditional likelihood compared
to the last attempt will be included into the existing
priors with a probability of 1; draws that fail to do so will
still be included, but with a probability only equal to the
proportion of the calculated likelihood (which is lower)
compared to the last calculation. The process continues
until a desired number of repeated experiments have
taken place,15 and the last update of the distribution of
the VAR coefficients reveals the posterior distributions of
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them, p(Φ| Y), whose means, or modes, or medians may
be seen as descriptors of the “average model,” the DSGE-
VAR(λ̂ ). The posterior distributions of the DSGE model
parameters, p(θ|Y), are then “solved” subsequently with
the DSGE cross-equations restrictions imposed on the
VAR coefficients. The structural shocks of the DSGE
model (εt) are identified from the VAR innovations (ut),
using the fact that ut = ΣtrΩεt in any exactly identified
VAR, by replacing the rotation matrix Ω with Ω* found
from QR-factorizing A0 =ΣtrΩ
  which determines the
contemporaneous response of variables to the structural
shocks of the DSGE model.
3.2 | Calibrated parameters and priors
We partition the DSGE model parameters into two groups,
where the first includes the discount factors (βP, βI, γ), the
technology parameters (uc, uh, vh, δkc, δkh, δh), the banking sec-
tor parameters (Ω, δϜ , χ, ηIbank), and the relevant steady-
state parameters (ϕ, X , ΘH , ΘE , ΞH , ΞE); the second is an
assembly of labour share and substitutabilities (α, ξP and
ξI, respectively), technology advancement (γAc, γAh), elas-
ticities (ηP, ηI), cost (c), determinants of nominal rigidity
(ϵ, ω), policy parameters (ρR, φπ, φx, ρΘ, zx) and parame-
ters governing the shocks’ size and evolution (σAc, σAh, σj,
σϕ, σψ, σπ, σB, σMP, σCP, σg, ρAc, ρAh, ρj, ρϕ, ρψ, ρπ, ρB, ρMP,
ρCP, ρg, ρgc). We follow the general practice to calibrate
the first group for that they are either hard to identify or
better pinned down with non-sample information
(e.g., Iacoviello & Neri, 2010). We then set priors for the
second group and have them updated using the data
information with the MCMC procedure, conditional on
the model. Our calibration and choice of priors are as the
following.
3.2.1 | Calibration
Within the theoretical boundaries, we set numerical values
for the calibrated parameters such that these parameters or
the implication of them is in line with the Chinese data or
established empirical literature on the Chinese economy.
Specifically, we follow Liu (2008), Zhang (2009) and
Ma (2011) to set the discount factor for patient house-
holds to βP = 0.985, which implies a steady-state value of
annual real interest rate of 6%. The discount factors for
impatient households and entrepreneurs are set to
βI=γ=0.97, which is somewhat lower, to ensure that
these agents have sufficient motive for borrowing and
that all borrowing constraints in the steady state are
binding. The capital share for normal goods production is
set to uc = 0.34, which implies a labour share under the
constant return-to-scale (CRS) assumption of 66%, which
resembles Bai and Qian (2010)'s calculation for the non-
construction sector of China of about 61%. The capital share
for house production is set to uh = 0.2, again, based on the
CRS assumption and Bai and Qian's calculation that finds
labour share in the construction sector to be about 70%,
while assuming the land share for house production to be
10% (i.e., vh = 0.1) as in Davis and Heathcote (2005).
16 The
depreciation rates of productive capital are set to δkc = 0.03
and δkh = 0.04, such that they work with uc to imply a
steady-state non-residential investment-to-GDP ratio ( IGDP )
of 21.2%, which resembles the long-run Chinese data of
32%. The depreciation rate of houses is set to δh = 0.015,
and the steady-state preference to houses is set to ϕ=0:1,
such that our model generates a steady-state (commer-
cial) residential investment-to-GDP ratio (qhihGDP ) of 3.4%,
which, again, mimics the data (2.7%).
As for the banking sector parameters, the optimal
capital-to-loan ratio is set to Ω = 0.09, which is just above
the minimum requirement of capital adequacy of 8% set
by the Basel Accord. While existing literature fails to pro-
vide much information about capital management cost of
commercial banks in China, we refer to the Euro Area
experience, thus, Gerali et al. (2010), and set δϜ =0:1049.
It turns out that these calibrations, together with the
banks’ profit retention ratio that we set to χ = 0.96, imply
a steady-state interest-rate spread of the normal banking
system of 3.24% per annum, which is literally what the
Chinese data implies. The interest-rate elasticity of
demand for shadow bank loans is set to ηSbank = 50.5, to
match the observation by Jiang (2015) that shadow loans
in China are about twice as expensive as normal loans.
Finally, we set the steady-state price mark-up to inter-
mediate goods to X =1:1 , following Liu and Ma (2015).
The steady-state LTV ratios are set to ΘH =0:3, ΞH =0:1,
ΘE =0:156 and ΞE =0:052, respectively, according to the
debt-to-GDP ratios of households and firms in China
(about 23% and 107%, respectively) found by
Edwards (2016), and the relative size of the Chinese
shadow-banking system compared to the normal system
(about 1:3) as Jiang (2015) gauges.
These calibrations are summarized in Table 1. In
Table 2, we compare the key steady-state ratios implied
by these calibrations and the long-run Chinese data; it
turns out that the implied steady-state ratios are fairly
similar to what are observed in practice. Thus, these cali-
brations are highly plausible.
3.2.2 | Priors
We choose priors that are commonly accepted in the lit-
erature of empirical studies with DSGE models. Thus, we
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follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to let the share of
patient households (α) follow a beta distribution, with
mean equal to 0.65; labour substitutabilities (ξP and ξI)
are normally distributed around 0.5, while labour elastici-
ties (ηP and ηI) have the same mean values but follow a
gamma distribution. Growth of technologies (γAc, γAh) is
let follow a normal distribution around 1.2% to reflect the
Chinese data. The cost parameter (c) follows a gamma
distribution as in Gerali et al. (2010), with mean in our
case equalling to 80. The degree of price indexation (ϵ)
and the Calvo contract non-resetting probability (ω) both
have a beta distribution, and their means are 0.5 and
0.667, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Monetary policy
parameters follow Smets and Wouters (2007), where
inflation response (φπ) and output response (φx) are nor-
mally distributed around 1.5 and 0.12, respectively, while
policy inertia (ρR) follows a beta distribution with mean
equalling 0.75. At this stage we are agnostic about the
credit policy parameters (ρΘ, zx); but since the credit pol-
icy resembles the Taylor rule in a major way, we assume
as the starting point that these parameters mimic the
Taylor rule counterparts. Finally, for using the method of
DSGE-VAR, we assume a uniform distribution for the
DSGE weight parameter (λ), with lower bound set to
0.3704 (which is the minimum value required for a valid
prior in our case), and upper bound set to 10, in analo-
gous to Adjemian, Paries, and Moyen (2008).
These priors (as well as the posteriors of them that we
estimate below) are summarized in Table 3. The distribu-
tions of shock parameters are standard, and Table 4 sum-
marizes the details.
3.3 | Data
Estimation of a DSGE-VAR requires the number of
observable variables to be equal to the number of struc-
tural shocks in the DSGE model for such shocks to be
identifiable. Since our DSGE model involves 10 structural
shocks, we choose 10 observable variables here, which
are real GDP, real total consumption, real total non-
residential investment, real house production, inflation,
real housing price, real land price, total labour hours,
nominal central bank rate, and nominal normal bank
(lending) rate. The data observed between 2001Q1 and
2014Q4 are plotted in Figure 1. All variables, except infla-
tion and the two interest rates, are measured in natural
logarithm, of which all, except total labour hours, are
measured in first difference for deterministic trends to be
removed. The data are all demeaned. The measurement
equations linking the data to the (log-linearized) model
are the following:
dln GDPObst
 
dln CObst
 
dln IObst
 
dln ihObst
 
πObst
dln qObsh,t
 
dln qObsl,t
 
ln NObst
 
RObst
RNL,Obst
266666666666666666666664
377777777777777777777775
=
dGDPt− dGDPt−1
Ĉt− Ĉt−1
Î t− Î t−1
îht− îht−1
πt
q̂h,t− q̂h,t−1
q̂l,t− q̂l,t−1
N̂ t
~Rt
~R
NL
t
266666666666666666664
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TABLE 1 Calibration
Parameter Definition
Calibrated
value
βP Discount factor (patient
households)
0.985
βI Discount factor (impatient
households)
0.97
γ Discount factor
(entrepreneurs)
0.97
uc Capital share (normal goods
production)
0.34
uh Capital share (house
production)
0.2
vh Land share (house production) 0.1
δkc Depreciation of capital (normal
goods production)
0.03
δkh Depreciation of capital (house
production)
0.04
δh Depreciation of houses 0.015
Ω Optimal capital-to-loan ratio 0.09
δϜ Bank capital management cost 0.1049
χ Bank profit retention ratio 0.96
ηSbank Interest-rate elasticity of
shadow bank loans
50.5
ϕ preference to houses 0.1
X price mark-up to intermediate
goods
1.1
ΘH loan-to-value ratio
(households; normal)
0.3
ΘE loan-to-value ratio
(entrepreneurs; normal)
0.156
ΞH loan-to-value ratio
(households; shadow)
0.1
ΞE loan-to-value ratio
(entrepreneurs; shadow)
0.052
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where “d” is the difference operator, “ln()” denotes the
natural logarithm of a variable, “Obs” denotes the
observed data, and “94” and “126“ are the deviation of a
variable from its steady-state value in percentage terms
and in level terms, respectively.17
3.4 | Posteriors
We may now compare the posteriors of the DSGE model
parameters to their priors in Tables 3 and 4. Most of these
parameters are found to have a posterior mean that is very
similar to their prior mean, suggesting that the priors chosen
are quite compatible with the data. However, the data do sug-
gest a much lower degree of price indexation (ϵ) and a some-
what shorter contract life (ω). This means the Chinese
economy may not be as “sticky” as some might have expected.
The data also suggest a stronger credit policy response to
output (zx), and that credit policy is rather “smoothed” (ρΘ).
All the shocks—except for those to preference (ρj), govern-
ment spending (ρg), inflation (ρπ), loan provision (ρB) and
monetary policy (ρMP)—are quite persistent, but their sizes are
quite different (the σ's). The estimation also suggests the opti-
mal weight of the DSGE theory (̂λ ) to be 0.5. While this
means our DSGE theory has good potential to be further
improved, it does show that our current specification is
providing useful theoretical restrictions for the VAR
structure to best mimic the data; and, since this value is
within the theoretical boundaries, it is perfectly valid.
Such an optimal theory-data combination, a DSGE-
VAR(0.50) (with one lag), is the structural model upon
which our empirical analyses in the rest of this paper are
built. As we show in Table 5, this model clearly outper-
forms its pure DSGE variant and the popular Bayesian
VAR specification with the Sims and Zha (1998) prior in
that it yields the highest marginal data likelihood. As for
TABLE 2 Steady-state ratios Steady-state ratios Definition Calibrated value Datac
C/GDP Consumption ratio 56.8% 50.1%
I/GDP Non-residential investment ratio 21.2% 32%
qhih/GDP Residential investment ratio
a 3.4% 2.7%
G/GDP Government spending ratiob 18.4% 14.6%
aCommodity houses only.
bInclusive of net export which counts for about 3.7%.
cPeriod between 1952–2014.
TABLE 3 Prior and posterior (structural parameters)
Prior distribution
Posterior
Parameter Definition Distribution Mean SD Mean
α Share of patient households Beta 0.65 0.05 0.65
ξP Labour substitutability (patient households) Normal 0.5 0.1 0.60
ξI Labour substitutability (impatient households) Normal 0.5 0.1 0.51
ηP Inverse of labour elasticity (patient households) Gamma 0.5 0.1 0.48
ηI Inverse of labour elasticity (impatient households) Gamma 0.5 0.1 0.47
100γAc Technology advancement (normal goods production) Normal 1.2 1 1.03
100γAh Technology advancement (house production) Normal 1.2 1 1.16
c Loan creation cost (normal banks) Gamma 80 10 80
ϵ Degree of price indexation (normal goods) Beta 0.5 0.2 0.06
ω Calvo contract non-resetting probability Beta 0.67 0.05 0.39
φπ Interest-rate response to inflation Normal 1.5 0.1 1.56
φx Interest-rate response to output growth Normal 0.12 0.1 0.14
ρR Monetary policy inertia Beta 0.75 0.2 0.79
ρΘ Credit policy inertia Beta 0.75 0.2 0.99
zx Credit policy response to output growth Normal −0.1 0.1 −0.44
λ Weight of DSGE theory Uniform N.A. N.A. 0.5
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the model's absolute fit to the data, we also find in Table 6
that it mimics the volatility and the correlation of most of
the observable variables fairly precisely (except for GDP
and consumption which are however not the focus of this
paper), though future improvement of the model would
require higher variable persistence. Overall, these compari-
sons suggest our DSGE-VAR (0.5) is a valid and empirically
superior model for analysing the housing price in China, as
we implement below. The impulse responses of this model
(of which we present those of the main variables in Figure
A1, Appendix A, to save space) are standard. Our empirical
findings with this model are presented in the next section.
4 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
4.1 | What determines the housing
dynamics?
4.1.1 | Variance decomposition
Figure 2 decomposes the forecast error variance of real
housing price and house production over various forecast
horizons. The decomposition suggests that housing price
is mostly a matter of the housing demand shock, which
accounts for up to 90% of its variation, both in the short
run (within a year's time), in the medium run (10 quarters
ahead), and in the long run (10 years ahead), although as
the impact of the credit policy shock looms large (which
accounts for some 12%) in the long run, it dominates less
overwhelmingly. The labour supply shock and the goods-
producing technology shock each contributes to a small
proportion over all forecast horizons, both accounting for
some 4%. Government spending and preference both play
a role in the short run, but empirically they hardly affect
anything. Interestingly, although many existing efforts
based on pure DSGE models (including those cited at the
beginning of this paper) have suggested monetary policy
could have been an important source, our DSGE-VAR-
based decomposition (which has better account for the fit
to the data) reveals that monetary policy shock actually
affects little—just like the remaining others.
On the production of houses, the house-producing
technology shock dominates the other two key factors—
in this case, the housing demand shock and the labour
supply shock—by a substantial margin, where the former
accounts for up to 83% in the short run, while as it moves
towards the longer runs it reduces to about 45% ulti-
mately (though it is still dominating). The credit policy
shock contributes to a similar proportion as in the case
for house prices. Other shocks are either not affecting at
all, or their impacts are hardly noticeable.
The above suggests that, although house production
is a more balanced mix of consequences of demand and
supply, house prices are hardly determined by supply fac-
tors. As one of our referees pointed, these supply factors
would include the “land factor” which, given the back-
ground of “land financing” of local Chinese governments,
is often thought to be significant a priori. In our model,
this is implicitly embraced by the house production tech-
nology shock, which hardly matters for house prices as
just shown. In more recent work, Liu and Ou (2019) relax
the perfect inelastic land supply assumption by introduc-
ing an explicit “land supply shock” partially driven by
innovations to government investment, to allow for the
land financing behaviour. They confirm that the land
supply shock does not affect housing price. In fact, they
find that the housing demand shock remains the most
important and dominating factor, as found here, and
widely in the literature.
4.1.2 | Historical decomposition
If we now decompose the historical data (measured as
deviation from the steady-state values) over the shocks
TABLE 4 Prior and posterior (shock processes)
Prior distribution
Posterior
Parameter Distribution Mean SD Mean
ρAc Beta 0.5 0.2 0.82
ρAh Beta 0.5 0.2 0.78
ρj Beta 0.5 0.2 0.46
ρϕ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.93
ρψ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.89
ρπ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.65
ρB Beta 0.5 0.2 0.62
ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.5
ρMP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.13
ρCP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99
ρgc Beta 0.5 0.25 0.49
100σAc Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.3
100σAh Inv. gamma 0.1 2 1.33
100σj Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.21
100σϕ Inv. gamma 0.1 2 3.24
100σψ Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.41
100σπ Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.13
100σB Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.04
100σMP Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.05
100σCP Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.09
100σg Inv. gamma 0.1 2 0.63
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we identify for the sample period (Figures 3 and 4), we
find that the upswing of housing price since the early
2000s was mainly caused by excess demand for houses,
which, before 2007, was aided by a rise in labour supply,
and thereafter, strong improvement in productivity in the
normal goods sector. A sudden fall in demand in 2008,
which could have reflected the market's reaction to the
global crisis, explains the temporary slowdown at the
time, while the rapid rebound that followed could be a
direct result of recovered confidence (which could have
been accompanied by some overshooting) after the crisis.
A series of property purchase restrictions adopted by
major first- and second-tier cities since 2010 could have
explained the lower demand that followed, which, never-
theless, failed to stabilize the market on its own. How-
ever, as demand and productivity both continued to fall
from 2013, it triggered another major slowdown, where
the housing price was corrected towards its equilibrium
level.
House production was a close follower of productivity
in the housing sector, which was quite volatile except
TABLE 5 Marginal likelihood of models
Model
Log marginal
data likelihood
DSGE-VAR(0.5) 1947
Pure DSGE 1,402
BVAR with Sims and Zha (1998) prior 789
Note: results reported for the DSGE-VAR and the pure DSGE model
are calculated with the modified harmonic mean estimator.
FIGURE 1 Data [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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between 2004 and 2007. The robust demand for houses
had been supporting production since 2004, especially
when reduced supply of labour caused substantial
downward pressure in the post-crisis period. Shocks to
productivity of normal goods, intertemporal preference,
inflation and government spending also affected occa-
sionally; but compared to the previous factors their
impacts were trivial.
4.1.3 | The role of shadow banking
It is interesting to know how shadow banking—the most
important innovation in our model—affects the previous
findings. Here we consider two aspects, one on the
model's fit, and the other on the timelines of the
historical data.
Table 7 compares the marginal data likelihood of a
model variant where the shadow-banking channel is
turned down, to that of the benchmark model. It shows
the model without shadow banking has a clearly worse
fit. Thus from the modelling point of view omitting
shadow banking would bias our calculations due to speci-
fication errors. Qualitatively this is caused by the failure
of reflecting shadow banks’ capacity in mitigating the
TABLE 6 Comparison of moments
Δ dGDP ΔbC ΔbI Δ bih π Δbqh Δbql bN ~R ~RNL
SD (%)
Data 0.44 0.52 1.07 3.08 0.58 2.65 1.43 1.72 0.11 0.13
Model 1.46 1.30 3.30 3.68 0.66 2.71 1.32 1.50 0.16 0.18
Cross-correlation with Δbqh
Data −0.05 0.21 0.048 −0.72 −0.63 1 0.72 −0.20 −0.43 −0.39
Model 0.10 −0.23 0.13 −0.45 −0.70 1 0.67 −0.17 −0.55 −0.33
Autocorrelation (Order = 1)
Data 0.62 0.49 0.55 0.40 0.50 0.37 0.44 0.91 0.76 0.85
Model −0.06 −0.23 0.05 0.01 −0.03 −0.12 −0.08 0.61 0.36 0.43
Note: model moments are calculated with 10,000 simulations of the same length as the data, generated by bootstrapping the shocks identified
over the sample period, using the posterior mean of the model parameters. Both the simulated data and actual data are HP-filtered before
moments are calculated.
FIGURE 2 Forecast error variance decompositions [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 3 Structural shocks [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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credit shock, which is fully absorbed in the mis-specified
model by normal banks. Quantitatively this mis-
specification biases the estimates of the model's parame-
ters including the standard errors of the structural shocks
which, in relation to what we analysed above, would bias
the variance decomposition of all the model variables.18
To see how shadow banks have helped mitigate the
credit shock in the history, we simulate its effect on the
housing variables using, respectively, the benchmark
model with shadow banking and the counter-factual
model variant without, using the same parameter values,
in Figure 5. We find house prices and house production
would have both been heavily destabilized by the credit
shock, especially in the post-crisis episode, had there not
been shadow banking. However, we also find this differ-
ence would not have substantially changed the timelines
of these variables—as we reproduce them in Figure 4
shutting down shadow banking—as the credit shock
itself is small compared to other shocks in the model and
hence, has never been a dominating factor in determin-
ing the housing cycle. In fact, we find what is more
affected is the PBoC interest rate, as we show the time-
lines of the key business cycle variables in Figure C1,
Appendix C, along with a detailed account of how the
importance of each shock is affected without shadow
banking in Tables C1 and C2.
Unfortunately, we are unable to study how shocks
from the shadow-banking system itself could have
affected in this case, as without reliable shadow-banking
data at the macro level we are unable to identify these
shocks. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing that these
shocks reflect risks within the shadow-banking system,
which could have spread over the whole economy
playing an important role in determining the data's
dynamics, via shadow-banking. This promises to be a
fruitful research area which we leave for future studies.
4.2 | The housing price “bubbles”: Were
there any, and what is the nature of them?
Having known what determined China's housing price
dynamics, we now ask: “were there any “bubbles,” and
what is the nature of them?”
While the theoretical literature has established quite
different mechanisms through which “bubbles” could
FIGURE 4 Historical
decompositions [Colour figure
can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 7 Marginal likelihood of models with and without
shadow banks
Model with
shadow banks
Model without
shadow banks
Log marginal
data likelihood
1947 1760
Note: Based on the modified harmonic mean estimator.
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have arisen, it is beyond the scope of our paper to debate
on which of them are more sensible when they are
applied to the housing market in China. Instead, our pur-
pose in this section is to evaluate what structural distur-
bances in a standard New Keynesian DSGE model like
ours could have accounted for what may be perceived as
housing price “bubbles” in the data, irrespective of how
they could have been triggered—whether by herding
behaviour (DeMarzo, Kaniel, & Kremer, 2008;
Scharfstein & Stein, 1990) or self-fulfilling expectations
(Miao, Wang, & Xu, 2015, 2016), as in “rational bubbles”
models, or by money illusion (Brunnermeier &
Julliard, 2008) or “agree to disagree” (Scheinkman &
Xiong, 2003), as in bounded-rational expectations
models.
Since bubbles are not directly observable, and that
competing theories of bubble formation (like the ones
just cited) “extract” bubbles from the data in completely
different ways, any bubbles gauged by a particular theory
may only be viewed as “bubbles” within that theory but
not in the others, as without that theory such bubbles
would not have been defined. For this reason, we choose
to follow the empirical literature to define “bubbles” with
indicators directly measurable with the data. Typical
examples of these include Meese and Wallace (1994) who
measure overpricing of houses based on the price-to-rent
ratio, and Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), based on price-
construction-costs differentials, and Joebges, Dullien, and
Márquez-Velázquez (2015), based on the deviation of
short-run house prices from long-run moving-average
values and the rapidity of boom-bust alterations. It is
Joebges et al. that we follow here, as what we are inter-
ested is not the extent to which housing price in China
deviates from the “fundamentals,” but what causes it to
boom and bust in some episodes, of which some can be
viewed as “bubbled.”
Specifically, we define bubble as a rapid increase in
real housing price (a “boom”), followed by an equally
severe decrease in it (a “bust”) within a short period of
time. We follow the IMF (2009) to define boom/bust as a
period during which the four-quarter moving average of
the annual growth of real housing price is above/below
FIGURE 5 The effect of
historical credit shocks [Colour
figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 6 Bubbled episode (actual data) [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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±5% (or in terms of quarterly growth, ±1.25%). We also
stipulate that a bust must happen within six months after
the end of a boom for such a boom to be viewed as a bub-
ble. With this definition, we identify one bubbled episode
between 2006Q4 and 2007Q4 over the data sample, as
illustrated in Figure 6. According to the previous histori-
cal decomposition, we know this was mainly due to
shocks to housing demand and productivity in the nor-
mal goods sector happened in that period.
But what is the nature of such bubbles (i.e., what
cause(s) them in general) according to the model? In
order to answer this question, we bootstrap the historical
shocks identified in Figure 3, for potential housing price
dynamics to be simulated under randomly different simu-
lations where the same shocks come in different time
orders.19 We repeat such an experiment for 80 times, with
simulation in each experiment lasting for 25 years; thus,
a total simulation of 2,000 years.
Table 8 summarizes the main findings of our simula-
tion exercise under three different scenarios: first, with
all the shocks hitting the economy; second, with all, but
not the housing demand shock; and third, with the hous-
ing demand shock only. Each of Figures 7–9 plots four
sample simulations of the housing price (left axis) against
the shocks hitting (right axis) in these experiments. We
find that:
a) While housing price booms happen quite regularly
in the medium run perspective (about every 3.2 years),
only 10% of them are followed by a bust within 6 months
for them to be regarded as “bubbles.” Thus, with all
TABLE 8 Frequency and duration of housing price booms/bubbles
Shocks to the economy Boom frequency Bubble frequency Bubble duration
All shocks Per 3.23 y Per 32.8 y 16.2 mo
All, but no housing demand shock Never Never N.A.
Only housing demand shock Per 4.8 y Per 80 y 17.8 mo
FIGURE 7 Simulations of housing price (all shocks) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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shocks hitting the economy, they happen about every
33 years, with bubbled episodes lasting for about
16 months.
b) Housing demand shocks are necessary for a hous-
ing price boom/bubble to happen; without them, a
boom/bubble would never occur, even when shocks to
the other factors are relatively sizeable (compare Figures 7
and 8 for how the simulated housing price is different
with/without the housing demand shock).
c) The housing demand shock is the only factor that
is capable to generate booms/bubbles on its own, there-
fore, causing “pure bubbles” which do not reflect any
changes in the “fundamentals,” although without the
assistance of other shocks they happen far less
frequently—about every 80 years (Sample simulations in
Figure 9). Any other shocks, either on their own, or
grouped as a bundle as just attempted, are incompetent
to generate bubbles.
Thus, our simulation exercise suggests that housing
price bubbles in China—as they are defined—are most
likely a joint outcome of non-fundamental factors (which
could have been changes of preference and/or
expectations) which cause demand for houses to be
“unreasonably” high, and fundamental factors (such as
changes in labour supply and/or productivities20) which
require housing price to rise for restoring equilibrium—
just as we saw from the historical decomposition. Of
these, the non-fundamental factors, as abstracted to be
the housing demand shock, play the decisive role, while
the fundamental factors deepen its effect. In other words,
such bubbles are mostly “demand-driven,” though in
most cases they are not only “pure bubbles,” but also a
reflection of changed fundamentals.
4.3 | Housing market spillovers: How
important is housing market prosperity to
economic growth?
We now come to the last question we aim to address in
this paper; that is, how could housing market prosperity
have meant to the growth of the Chinese economy?
As we motivated at the beginning of this paper, one
important reason why development of the housing price,
FIGURE 8 Simulations of housing price (all, but no housing demand shock). Monetary policy shock, credit policy shock and banking
shock are rescaled up by ten times in this figure for illustration purposes [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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or more broadly, that of the housing market, has received
wide concerns is that it is often shown to have an impli-
cation to the growth of an economy according to world
experience—Japan in the 1990s, the United States in the
late 2007, Australia between the late 1990s and the early
2000s and Colombia in the early 1990s, and so
on. Existing studies in this area have mostly built on a
reduced-form model such as a VAR/VECM to test the
“spillover” effects from the housing market to the wider
economy. Most have found the former affects the latter
positively; for example, Iacoviello and Neri (2010) find
U.S. consumption is positively affected by the value of
housing stock; Liu, Park, and Zheng (2002) and Chen
et al. (2011) find GDP growth in China is positively
affected by residential investment. While these reduced-
form models do not establish evidence of “why”/”how”
one variable affects another (for the reasons we explained
at the beginning of this paper), one could still use them
as a parsimonious description of the data dynamics gen-
erated by the “true,” structural model (like our DSGE-
VAR or other DSGE models). The focus in this case is on
the so-called “Granger causality,” which predicts how
changes in one variable affect those of another in statisti-
cal terms.
Thus, to investigate how housing market prosperity
could have affected growth following this convention, we
set up an unrestricted VAR for the growths of real out-
put, real housing price and house production. However,
instead of estimating it on the actual data as most previ-
ous authors, we first use our structural model (our DSGE-
FIGURE 9 Simulations of housing price (only housing demand shock) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 9 Estimates of the unrestricted VAR
Coeff. Sim. mean 95% LB 95% UB Actual
β12 0.1275 −0.0693 0.3123 0.0463
β13 0.0632 −0.0634 0.1958 0.0261
β21 −0.1243 −0.6785 0.4136 −0.0369
β23 −0.0336 −0.2617 0.2078 0.0248
β31 −0.6685 −1.3209 0.0365 0.0780
β32 0.5262 0.0948 0.9585 0.0279
Joint Wald percentile 92
p-value .08
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VAR) to generate 1,000 sets of simulated data with the same
length as the sample data.21 We then estimate a VAR (1) on
the simulated data to generate 1,000 sets of VAR coefficients,
and we calculate their mean values.22 The coefficients on the
lagged terms of the VAR therefore suggest how one variable
is Granger-caused by the others, according to our structural
model. If we specify the unrestricted VAR as:
ΔYt
Δqh,t
Δiht
264
375= β11 β12 β13β21 β22 β23
β31 β32 β33
264
375 ΔYt−1Δqh,t−1
Δiht−1
264
375+Errorst ð43Þ
These will be β12, β13, β21, β23, β31 and β32.
The first column of Table 9 reports the mean of the
Least Squares estimates of these coefficients. It shows
that a 1% rise in real housing price would “cause” real
output to grow by 0.13% (β12), while the same rise in
house production would raise output by just less than
0.06% (β13). While these numbers are broadly consistent
with those found with actual data in the literature (such
as the ones just cited), they suggest that:
a. A prosperous housing market would benefit growth of
the macroeconomy, mostly via the rise in housing
price, though its marginal impact is small.
b. A corollary that follows is that, unless in extreme
cases when housing price collapses substantially,
“modest” falls in them are not likely to lead to
recessions—just as we observed in 2008 (Figure 6)
when the burst of housing price bubbles did not cause
any real damages to China's output.
On the other way around, a rise in output leads to a
fall both in housing price (β21) and in house production
(β31), so real residential investment falls. Regarding the
interaction between housing price and house production,
there is a small, negative impact of the latter on the for-
mer (β23); but the feedback from the former to the latter
is positive and much bigger (β32).
Such theoretical implications can be tested formally
by comparing the distribution of β's to their
corresponding values estimated with the actual data. Spe-
cifically, we set the null hypothesis (H0) that “β12, β13,
β21, β23, β31 and β32 are all equal to their simulated mean
values, and test it against the alternative (H1) that “not
all these β's equal their simulated means.” We then find
the joint distribution of β”s with the 1,000 sets of simu-
lated data by calculating the Wald statistic (WS):
WS= Φ− Φð Þ0
X−1
Φ− Φð Þ ð44Þ
which measures the “Mahalanobis distance” between
each set of β's estimated with the simulated data (Φ) and
their mean values (Φ ), normalized by their variance–
covariance matrix (Σ). The 1,000 sets of simulated data
therefore generate an empirical distribution of WS,
WSSimi
 1000
i=1 , which can be evaluated against the WS
value calculated with the actual data,WSAct. SinceWS = 0
when H0 is true, the bigger WS
Act is, the more H0 is
rejected by the actual data. In practice, one can use the
percentile of WSSimi
 1000
i=1 where WS
Act lies—call it the
“Joint Wald percentile”—to decide whether H0 is rejected
or not. The p-value, by definition, is p = (100− Joint
Wald percentile)/100.
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It turns out that H0 passes the Joint Wald test easily,
as the p-value reported (0.08) is well above the usual 5%
threshold (though as for individual parameters the model
slightly under-predicted β31 and over-predicted β32).
Thus, our final assessment of the structural model using
the method of Indirect Inference testifies to the following
implications: although the macroeconomy could benefit
from a prosperous housing market, it would be quite
costly to maintain growth by just boosting the latter, for
its efficacy is low. On the contrary, if policies are to stabi-
lize the housing market, such small spillovers would also
mean that the cost on output reduction would be rather
limited, especially when the key determinant of housing
price is correctly identified; and, according to our decom-
position exercise above, this would be the housing
demand shock, which determines most of the housing
price, but affects output just a little.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied what determines China's
housing price dynamics by establishing a DSGE model,
allowing for the unique feature of the Chinese banking
system where “shadow banks” operate as a shadow-
banking department of “normal” commercial banks,
which has never been attempted before. We estimate the
model using the DSGE-VAR method in the spirit of Del
Negro and Schorfheide (2004, 2006) and Del Negro
et al. (2007), for a best theory-data combination to be
found, and we build our investigation on such a
combination.
We find that the housing demand shock, which may
be interpreted as shocks to preference for houses
(or other factors not modelled within the model's struc-
ture), explains near 90% of the housing price fluctuation,
with the rest assisted by shocks to labour supply, produc-
tivity and credit policy. Although Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) point out that whether such housing demand
shocks are spontaneous, primitive and interpretable
remains an open question for further research, the pre-
liminary investigation by Ng (2015) suggests these could
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have been variations in gender imbalance, stock market
performance, the number of potential buyers, and urban
unemployment in China. Monetary policy shocks, which
are often claimed to play a role by authors using pure
DSGE models (which generally fit the data less well com-
pared to a DSGE-VAR), are muted on this occasion; and
so are the main others, including the fiscal policy shock,
the inflation shock, and the banking shock. The housing
demand shock is also found to be the essential cause of
the housing price “bubbles,” deepened, and made happen
more often than otherwise by the others. Hence, housing
price bubbles in China are mostly a joint outcome of
“pure bubbles,” and changed fundamentals that require
housing price to rise for an equilibrium to be restored.
Finally, our model also implies a weak spillover effect
from the housing market to the macroeconomy, which is
not rejected by the sample data. This means that, if
policy-makers attempt to maintain growth of the Chinese
economy by simply boosting the housing market, they
would find the efficacy is very low. However, if policies
are made for stabilizing the housing market, on the con-
trary, they should not be threatened that such stabiliza-
tion would weigh on the real economy any seriously.
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ENDNOTES
1 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (“Average sale
price of residential houses”).
2 Some authors—such as Chow and Niu (2014)—do not estimate
the equilibrium equation(s) directly; instead, they try to imply the
equilibrium indirectly by estimating the partial model as a simul-
taneous equations framework using the 2SLS approach. However,
the endogeneity problem does not go away even if the equilibrium
is found in this way. This is because to apply the 2SLS approach
one has to force at least some variables in the simultaneous equa-
tions framework to be exogenous, for the “endogenous explana-
tory variables” to be predicted with the reduced-form model in
“the first stage.” However, from a practical viewpoint these vari-
ables that are forced to be exogenous—“real disposal income” and
“real construction cost” as in Chow and Niu, for example, are
usually endogenously determined by something else which may
or may not be within the simultaneous equations framework
itself. Thus, the 2SLS approach would not bypass the predicament
in a real sense.
3 We assume patient households supply homogeneous labour ser-
vices to the union, who will then differentiate them for them to
be used in different producing sectors, as in Smets and
Wouters (2007). This assumption is also made to impatient house-
holds as we model below.
4 We have let profit from banks be transferred to patient house-
holds with one lag to reflect that these profits are only available
when loans are due at the end of each period. χ is the retention
ratio that normal banks set for accumulating bank capitals as we
define in the banking sector below.
5 For example, a tightened credit policy can lower the amount of
loans borrowed from normal banks; this causes more loans
(in terms of fraction) to be borrowed from shadow banks which
are much less manipulated by the public sector.
6 We follow the standard practice to treat patient household labour
and impatient household labour to be imperfect substitutes for
each other to reflect heterogeneity of labour skills carried by the
two kinds of households (Gerali et al., 2010; Iacoviello &
Neri, 2010; Ng, 2015). The assumption highlights the complemen-
tarity of different labour skills. Iacoviello and Neri find that
this has the advantage of keeping the model dynamics tractable
while the empirical implication is not much affected compared
to the alternative specification where perfect substitution is
allowed for.
7 CES stands for “constant elasticity of substitution.”
8 Vt,t+ i  U
0
c,t
U
0
c,t+ i
in (16) defines the stochastic inter-temporal substi-
tution of normal goods consumption. θ in (17) is the price
elasticity.
9 Allen, Qian, and Xie (2019) study how informal financing has
supported the growth of different firms and the economy. Allen,
Qian, Tu, and Yu (2019) study the properties, lenders and bor-
rowers, and pricing of entrusted loans.
10 Carvalho, Pasca, Souza, and Zilberman (2014) suggest these
could be resources used for agency services and/or the banks’
operations.
11 ΠSbankt = 1+ rILt
 
− 1+ rNLt
  
ILt , where ILt = b
I 00
t + b
E00
t .
12 We have chosen to use a Taylor rule, rather than a money sup-
ply rule, as a parsimonious description of the complex policy-
making process of the People's Bank of China. While the use
of a money supply rule would not have altered the underlying
mechanism through which other main variables of our model
could have been affected by a “monetary policy shock,” the
use of a Taylor rule has the advantage of circumventing the
well-known difficulties in measuring monetary aggregates due
to the increasing degrees of financial deregulation and innova-
tion. Essentially, the Taylor rule here can be interpreted as an
implicit interest rate target the PBoC aims to achieve—by
whatever means, whether using money supply, guidance, or
other policy instruments.
13 Four model variants including the benchmark model are com-
pared. The benchmark specification embedded (34) has a log
marginal likelihood of 1947. The other model variants assuming
Θt responds a) only to credit growth, b) only to house price
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growth and c) to both credit and house price growths have likeli-
hood of 1,689, 1,698 and 1,657, respectively.
14 As one of our referees has pointed out, interactions between the
normal banking system and the shadow banking system are so
complex in practice. Thus, our assumption that, when monetary
authority attempts to manipulate the size of the credit market
using macro-prudential policy, tightened credit controls reduce
the size of the normal banking system but (unintendedly) lead to
an expansion of the shadow system as borrowers get around
credit controls by substituting more shadow loans for normal
loans, is one of many possible ways normal banks and shadow
banks in China interact. This assumption highlights the substi-
tutability of the two systems when one is imposed with restric-
tions that do not apply to the other. Thus, although the shadow
system is not regulated, its size can still vary in an opposite direc-
tion to that of the normal system when changes in credit condi-
tion in the latter are caused, not by systematic shifts of risk of the
whole financial market (which would affect both the systems in
the same way), but by non-systematic shifts of regulatory poli-
cies, ceteris paribus.
15 We allow for a sample of 10,000,000 draws in our practice, where
the first 20% draws are dropped.
16 vh is the only parameter that we are unable to find direct evi-
dence from China but have to assign a value with reference to
the US literature. Nevertheless, as we go on to elaborate, this
value—combined with others chosen according to the Chinese
data—implies a steady-state residential investment ratio (qhihGDP )
that mimics the data very well. Thus, this calibration is highly
plausible.
17 Details about data sources and how raw data are manipulated
before they are used here are outlined in Appendix B.
18 We find the bias is substantial, mainly because the mis-specified
model implies very different standard errors of the shocks. Since
this is purely a numerical issue and there is no way to know how
the mis-specification would affect the final decomposition ex-
ante, we do not present the spurious result here in detail. How-
ever the result is available on request.
19 In particular, we bootstrap our sample innovation matrix
ui,t    uz,t
..
. . .
. ..
.
ui,T    uz,T
2664
3775 , where i…z represent different shocks and t…T
are time subscripts, by time vectors in each random draw. This is
to preserve any potential correlations between the different
shocks as reflected by the sample data.
20 Recall that Figure 2 suggests other factors do not contribute
much to the housing price variation.
21 This is done by bootstrapping the historical shocks identified for
the sample period, just as how we did in the simulation exercise
above.
22 We choose a VAR (1) here because for each simulation the sam-
ple size is small.
23 This is essentially the Indirect Inference Wald test recently devel-
oped by Le, Meenagh, Minford, and Wickens (2011) for testing
DSGE models with the frequentist method. While Φ can in prin-
ciple embrace any parameters of a chosen reduced-form model
(or functions of them), we only include those as listed in Table 9
here, as our purpose is just to test whether the Granger causal
relations among the variables chosen, as predicted by our DSGE-
VAR, are rejected by the actual data.
24 We assume that shifts of credit policy affect household and entre-
preneur borrowing from normal banks in the same manner, so
that Θ̂t= Θ̂H,t= Θ̂E,t=- Ξ̂H,t=- Ξ̂E,t .
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APPENDIX A: MODEL, IMPULSE RESPONSES,
AND GLOSSARY OF VARIABLES AND
DISTURBANCES
Optimisations, policies and identities
The patient household problem:
Patient households maximize:
LP =E0
X∞
t=0
βPGcP
 t
jt lnc
P
t +ϕtlnh
P
t −
ψ t
1+ ηP

nP1+ ξ
P
c, t +n
P1+ ξP
h, t
 1+ ηP
1+ ξP
	
ðA:1Þ
by choosing cPt , h
P
t , n
P
c,t , n
P
h,t and St, subject to budget
constraint:
cPt + qh, t h
P
t − 1−δhð ÞhPt−1
 
+ St =w
P
c, tn
P
c, t +w
P
h, tn
P
h, t
+ 1+ rSt−1
 
St−1 +Π
Fgds
t + ΠNbankt−1 −χΠ
Nbank
t−1
 
+ΠSbankt−1 −τt
ðA:2Þ
The first order conditions are:
∂LP
∂cPt
: jt
1
cPt
= λPt ðA:3Þ
∂LP
∂hPt
: jt
ϕt
hPt
+ βPGcPEtλ
P
t+1qh,t+1 1−δhð Þ= λPt qh,t ðA:4Þ
∂LP
∂nPc,t
: jtψ t n
P1+ ξP
c,t +n
P1+ ξP
h,t
 ηP −ξP
1+ ξP nPξ
P
c,t = λ
P
t w
P
c,t ðA:5Þ
∂LP
∂nPh,t
: jtψ t n
P1+ ξP
c,t +n
P1+ ξP
h,t
 ηP −ξP
1+ ξP nPξ
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h,t = λ
P
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h,t ðA:6Þ
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∂LP
∂St
: βPGcPEtλ
P
t+1 1+ r
S
t
 
= λPt ðA:7Þ
The impatient household problem:
Impatient households maximize:
LI =E0
X∞
t=0
βIGcI
 t
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borrowing constraint for normal bank loans:
bI
0
t ≤ΘH,t
Et qh,t+1h
I
t
 
1+ rNLt
ðA:10Þ
and borrowing constraint for shadow bank loans:
bI
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The first order conditions are:
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The entrepreneur problem:
Entrepreneurs maximize:
LE =E0
X∞
t=0
γGcEð Þt jtlncEt ðA:18Þ
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borrowing constraint for normal bank loans:
bE
0
t ≤ΘE,t
Et ql,t+1lt + kc,t + kh,t
 
1+ rNLt
ðA:20Þ
borrowing constraint for shadow bank loans:
bE
00
t ≤ΞE,t
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production function for normal goods:
Yt = Ac,t n
P
c,t
 α
nIc,t
 1−αh i1−uc
kucc,t−1 ðA:22Þ
production function for houses:
iht = Ah,t nPh,t
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nIh,t
 1−αh i1−uh−vh
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evolution of capital for normal goods production:
kc,t−kc,t−1 = ic,t−δkckc,t−1 ðA:24Þ
evolution of capital for house production:
kh,t−kh,t−1 = ih,t−δkhkh,t−1 ðA:25Þ
The first order conditions are:
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The retailer problem:
In each period retailers maximize:
LRt =Et
X∞
i=0
ωβPGc
 i
V t,t+ i
pt+ i jð Þ
Pt+ i
 	
Yt+ i jð Þ− 1Xt+ i Y t+ i jð Þ
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by choosing pt( j), subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
CES demand function:
Yt jð Þ= pt jð ÞPt
 	−θ
YFinalt ðA:39Þ
and the price indexation rule:
pt+ i jð Þ= pt jð Þ
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The first order condition implies the optimal reset
price to be:
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Let the general price level be:
Pt =
ð1
0
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 1
1−θ
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Equations A.40, A.41 and A.42 then imply the
“hybrid-version” New Keynesian Phillips curve, where
inflation shock (ε̂π,t) is also allowed for:
πt =
βPGc
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Etπt+1 +
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+
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Retailers’ profit in each period is:
ΠFgdst = 1−
1
Xt
 	
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The normal bank problem:
In each period, normal banks maximize:
Max
Bt
ΠNbankt =
X∞
t=0
ΛNbank0, t 1+ r
NL
t
 
Bt−Bt+1
 f
+ St+1− 1+ rSt
 
St
 
−
c
2
Ϝt
Bt
−Ω
 	2
Ϝt +ΔϜt+1g
ðA:45Þ
by choosing Bt, subject to balance sheet constraint:
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Bt = St + Ϝ t ðA:46Þ
and the accumulation process of bank capital:
Ϝ t = 1−δϜ
 
Ϝ t−1 + χΠNbankt−1 ðA:47Þ
The first order condition is:
rNLt −r
S
t
 
= −c
Ϝ t
Bt
−Ω
 	
Ϝ t
Bt
 	2
ðA:48Þ
Here, we assume that the above optimal condition
may not always hold in practice, so that implementa-
tion of it is subject to “banking shock” (εB, t), as the
following:
εB,t r
NL
t −r
S
t
 
= −c
Ϝ t
Bt
−Ω
 	
Ϝ t
Bt
 	2
ðA:49Þ
The shadow bank problem:
In each period, individual shadow bank z maximizes:
Max
rILt zð Þ
ΠSbankt zð Þ=
X∞
t=0
ΛSbank0,t 1+ r
IL
t zð Þ
 
ILt zð Þ− 1+ rNLt
 
ILt zð Þ
 
ðA:50Þ
by choosing rILt , subject to the demand for loan
equation:
ILt zð Þ= 1+ r
IL
t zð Þ
1+ rILt

 −ηSbank
ILt ðA:51Þ
The first order condition is:
1+ rILt zð Þ=
ηSbank
ηSbank−1
 	
1+ rNLt
  ðA:52Þ
which, by imposing a symmetric equilibrium to the
economy, further implies:
1+ rILt =
ηSbank
ηSbank−1
 	
1+ rNLt
  ðA:53Þ
Public sector policies:
Taylor rule:
1+Rt = 1+Rt−1ð ÞρR 1+ πtð Þ 1−ρRð Þφπ GDPtGcGDPt−1
 	 1−ρRð Þφx
1+ rssð Þ 1−ρRð ÞεMP, t
ðA:54Þ
Credit policy24:
Θt =Θ
ρΘ
t−1
GDPt
GcGDPt−1
 	zx
Θ1−ρΘεCP,t ðA:55Þ
Government spending:
gt = τt ðA:56Þ
Market clearing
Normal goods market clearing:
Ct + It + gt =Yt−
c
2
Ϝ t−1
Bt−1
−Ω
 	2
Ϝ t−1−δϜϜ t−1 ðA:57Þ
Housing market clearing:
hPt − 1−δhð ÞhPt−1 + hIt − 1−δhð ÞhIt−1 = iht ðA:58Þ
Land market clearing:
lt =l ðA:59Þ
Financial market clearing:
bI
0
t + b
I00
t + b
E0
t + b
E00
t =Bt ðA:60Þ
Labour market clears automatically due to the
Walras's law.
Identities
Total consumption:
cPt + c
I
t + c
E
t =Ct ðA:61Þ
Total investment:
ic,t + ih,t = It ðA:62Þ
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Total labour:
nPc,t
 α
nIc,t
 1−α
+ nPh,t
 a
nIh,t
 1−α
=Nt ðA:63Þ
Definition of GDP:
GDPt =Yt + qhiht ðA:64Þ
Fisher identity a:
rSt =Rt−Etπt+1 ðA:65Þ
Fisher identity b:
rNLt =R
NL
t −Etπt+1 ðA:66Þ
Trends and shock evolution
Technology growth (normal goods production):
Ac,t = 1+ γAcð ÞtZc,t ðA:67Þ
Technology growth (house production):
Ah,t = 1+ γAhð ÞtZh,t ðA:68Þ
Technology shock (normal goods production):
lnZc,t = ρAclnZc,t−1 + lnuAc,t ðA:69Þ
Technology shock (house production):
lnZh,t = ρAhlnZh,t−1 + lnuAh,t ðA:70Þ
Intertemporal preference shock:
ln jt = ρ jln jt−1 + lnu j,t ðA:71Þ
Housing preference shock:
lnϕt = 1−ρϕ
 
lnϕ+ ρϕlnϕt−1 + lnuϕ,t ðA:72Þ
Labour supply shock:
lnψ t = ρψ lnψ t−1 + lnuψ ,t ðA:73Þ
Inflation shock:
lnεπ,t = ρπlnεπ,t−1 + lnuπ,t ðA:74Þ
Banking shock:
lnεB,t = ρBlnεB,t−1 + lnuB,t ðA:75Þ
Monetary policy shock:
lnεMP,t = ρMPlnεMP,t−1 + lnuMP,t ðA:76Þ
Credit policy shock:
lnεCP,t = ρCPlnεCP,t−1 + lnuCP,t ðA:77Þ
Government spending shock:
lngt = ρglngt−1 + lnug,t + ρgclnuAc,t ðA:78Þ
where uAc, t, uAh, t, uj, t, uϕ, t, uψ , t, uπ, t, uB, t, uMP, t,
uCP, t and ug, t are all i. i. d. innovations.
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Impulse responses of main model variables
F IGURE A1 Impulse responses of main model variables [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Glossary of model variables and disturbances
TABLE A1 Model variables
GDPt Gross domestic product ΠSbankt Shadow banks’ profit
Yt Total normal goods production Ϝ t Normal banks’ capital
iht Total house production πt Inflation in the normal goods sector
cPt Patient household consumption qh, t Real price of houses
cIt Impatient household consumption ql, t Real price of lands
cEt Entrepreneur consumption Rt Central bank nominal interest rate
Ct Total private consumption RNLt Normal bank nominal loan rate
hPt Patient household demand for houses r
NL
t Normal bank real loan rate
hIt Impatient household demand for houses r
IL
t Shadow bank real loan rate
ic, t Investment for normal goods production rSt Normal bank real saving rate
ih, t Investment for houses production Θt Credit tightness
It Total (non-residential) private investment ΘH, t Loan-to-value ratio (households; normal bank
loans)
gt Government spending ΘE, t Loan-to-value ratio (entrepreneurs; normal bank
loans)
τt Tax revenue ΞH, t Loan-to-value ratio (households; shadow bank
loans)
nPc,t Patient household labour for normal goods
production
ΞE, t Loan-to-value ratio (entrepreneurs; shadow bank
loans)
nPh,t Patient household labour for houses production Xt Mark-up to price of intermediate goods
nIc,t Impatient household labour for normal goods
production
wPc,t Real wage for patient households for normal
goods production
nIh,t Impatient household labour for houses
production
wPh,t Real wage for patient households for houses
production
Nt Total labour hours wIc,t Real wage for impatient households for normal
goods production
kc, t Physical capital for normal goods production wIh,t Real wage for impatient households for houses
production
kh, t Physical capital for houses production b
I0
t Impatient household borrowing from normal
banks
lt Lands b
I00
t Impatient household borrowing from investment
banks
Ac, t Technology for normal goods production b
E0
t Entrepreneur borrowing from normal banks
Ah, t Technology for houses production b
E00
t Entrepreneur borrowing from investment banks
ΠFgdst Retailers’ profit Bt Total borrowing
ΠNbankt Normal banks’ profit St Total saving
TABLE A2 Model disturbance
Zc, t Technology shock (normal goods production) επ, t Inflation shock
Zh, t Technology shock (house production) εB, t Banking shock
jt Inter-temporal preference shock εMP, t Monetary policy shock
ϕt Housing preference shock εCP, t Credit policy shock
ψ t Labour supply shock gt Government spending shock
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APPENDIX B: MEASUREMENT, SOURCES AND
ADJUSTMENTS OF DATA
We use as observable variables of the model the time
series of GDPt, Ct, It, iht, πt, qh, t, ql, t, Nt, Rt and RNLt .
All real-sector variables (where applicable) are normal-
ized by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the
working-age population index (pop), and are measured
in natural logarithm. πt measures the quarter-on-
quarter growth of CPI. qh and ql are both log relative
prices to CPI. Rt and RNLt are both quarterly interest rate.
All the data are demeaned, detrended when they are used
for estimation.
The observation sample spans from 2001Q1 to
2014Q4, and are sourced from the National Bureau of Sta-
tistics of China, the Ministry of Land and Resources,
P.R.C., the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, P.R.C.,
the People's Bank of China and Oxford Economics. In
cases where the source data are only available on annual
basis, we convert them to quarterly data by using either
the “quadratic-match sum” or the “quadratic-match aver-
age” algorithms with Eviews®. Wherever applicable, the
data are seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census
Bureau's “X-13ARIMA-SEATS” method.
The measurement and sources of the data and the
adjustments to them are summarized in Table B1.
TABLE B1 Measurement, sources and adjustments of data
Time
series Measurement Sourcef
Normalized
by CPI?
Normalized
by pop?
Natural
logarithm?
Seasonally
adjusted?
GDPt Gross domestic product NBSC √ √ √ √
Ct Total private consumption NBSC √ √ √ √
It Total private investment, net of
residential investment
NBSC √ √ √ √
iht House production (newly built
commodity houses)a
NBSC √ √ √ √
πt Quarter-on-quarter CPI inflation
b NBSC N.A. N.A. N.A. √
qh, t House Price Index (HPI)
c NBSC √ N.A. √ √
ql, t Land Price Index (LPI) MLR √ N.A. √ √
Nt Total labour hours
d MLSS N.A. √ √ √
Rt PBoC Rediscount Rate PBoC N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
RNLt Commercial bank Prime Lending
Rate
PBoC N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
popt Working-age population index
e OE N.A. N.A. N.A. √
Note: MLR—Ministry of Land and Resources, P.R.C. (via China Urban Land Price Dynamic Monitor; http://www.landvalue.com.cn/);
MLSS—Ministry of Labour and Social Security, P.R.C. (via the China Labour Statistical Yearbook [2004, 2006 and 2015]); PBoC—People's
Bank of China (via Datastream®); OE—Oxford Economics (via Datastream®).
aBased on the “Value of Completed Commodity Houses” from NBSC and the House Price Index (for commodity houses).
bBased on the Consumer Price Index from NBSC.
cBased on the “Average Sales Price of Commodity Houses” from NBSC.
dBased on the “Weekly working hours in urban area” from MLSS.
eBased on the “Working-age Population” from OE.
fNBSC—National Bureau of Statistics of China;
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APPENDIX C: TIMELINES FOR BUSINESS
CYCLE VARIABLES AND IMPORTANCE OF
SHOCKS WITHOUT SHADOW BANKING
FIGURE C1 Historical decomposition of business cycle variables [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE C1 Variance decomposition of housing variables (and changes without shadow banking)
Variable Forecast horizon Hse. demand Hse. prod. Gds. prod. Lab. supply Credit Others
Housing price 1 88.36 0.17 3.98 4.38 0.53 2.58
(−3.25) (−0.08) (+0.72) (+0.57) (+2.2) (−0.16)
2 89.59 0.27 3.60 4.11 0.53 1.89
(−3.45) (−0.08) (+0.51) (+0.44) (+2.56) (+0.03)
4 90.92 0.47 3.16 3.77 0.49 1.19
(−3.19) (+0.00) (+0.20) (+0.15) (+2.78) (+0.07)
10 91.79 0.79 2.72 3.57 0.39 0.74
(−2.85) (+0.04) (+0.05) (−0.05) (+2.77) (+0.05)
40 89.83 1.66 2.66 3.57 1.63 0.66
(−2.58) (+0.02) (+0.00) (−0.12) (+2.65) (+0.03)
100 80.29 1.77 2.38 3.18 11.79 0.59
(−6.72) (−0.08) (−0.14) (−0.28) (+7.24) (−0.01)
New house production 1 11.67 84.20 0.00 3.34 0.00 0.79
(−0.24) (+0.33) (+0.00) (−0.07) (+0.00) (−0.02)
2 22.40 73.26 0.00 3.68 0.02 0.64
(−0.33) (+0.04) (+0.00) (+0.04) (+0.22) (+0.03)
4 29.45 65.90 0.00 4.18 0.02 0.44
(−0.42) (+0.16) (+0.00) (−0.07) (+0.30) (+0.03)
10 39.72 54.88 0.02 5.04 0.02 0.32
(−0.48) (+0.26) (−0.01) (−0.15) (+0.36) (+0.02)
40 43.93 49.44 0.12 5.27 0.93 0.31
(−0.47) (+0.33) (−0.02) (−0.2) (+0.35) (+0.01)
100 41.64 46.65 0.12 4.97 6.34 0.29
(−0.97) (−0.3) (−0.03) (−0.24) (+1.54) (+0.01)
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